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Abstract: If a person has lost all or most of her capacities for agency, how can she 
be harmed? This paper begins by describing several ways in which a person loses, 
or never develops, significant capacities of agency. In contrast with other work in 
this area, the central analyses are not of fetuses, small children, or the cognitively 
disabled. The central analyses are of victims of mistreatment or oppressive social 
circumstances. These victims are denuded of their agential capacities, becoming, in 
an important sense, objects or pseudo-agents. In light of this, the concern of this paper 
is how further harm to ersatz agents should be understood.
Keywords: agency, harm, objectification, personhood
1. The Problem of How to Treat Objects
One way in which people can be harmed is by taking away their capacity for 
agency, or by treating them as objects. In some cases, the diminution of agency 
is inevitable and natural—for example, cognitive decline at the end of life. In 
other cases, it is the result of oppression and mistreatment. Once a person has 
been stripped of agential capacities, can they still be harmed? It can be taken 
for granted that treating persons as if they are objects is morally wrong. But 
what about treating those who used to be persons as objects? Prima facie, 
much of what is morally wrong with treating persons as objects has to do with 
their capacities for agency. If they have no such capacities, then they cannot 
be harmed in as many ways. Of course, one could argue that nothing could 
strip a person of their personhood; no amount of mistreatment could transform 
an agent into an object. Then we would have to say that forms of oppression 
which appear to strip people of agency are not as bad as they seem. They do 
not result in lasting damage to a person’s core capacities. Yet this does not 
seem correct either because this is exactly what is most deeply wrong with 
certain forms of oppression. This is a dilemma. Either it is the case that (i) a 
person cannot lose agential capacity through mistreatment, or (ii) a person can 
lose agential capacities through mistreatment and that person is less harmed 
by subsequent mistreatment.
This is not a good choice. (ii) looks repugnant. (i) goes against very strong 
intuitions about the harm of certain forms of oppression. After describing sev-
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eral varieties of diminished agency, I resolve this dilemma with a reading of 
(ii) that pacifies the sense of repugnance. I do this in part by arguing that 
there is a set of positive obligations compatible with regarding the victims of 
mistreatment as having lost, in some way, their personhood. To be completely 
clear, my ultimate objective is not to determine the moral worthiness of con-
tinuing to treat anyone as an object. I maintain the intuition that this is, on its 
very face, largely repugnant. My task instead is to propose a richer and deeper 
understanding of this category of harm by working through the reasons for our 
moral obligations to one another.
2. Varieties of Diminished Agency
The claim I am considering here is that some forms of mistreatment are harm-
ful precisely because they denude the victim of the capacity for agency. For 
example, this could occur if a person is treated as lacking autonomy, as merely 
fungible, or as instrumental for the needs of another. It could also occur if a 
person is treated as property, if their worth is reduced to their body or appear-
ance, or if they are violated or treated as essentially violable.1 This allows for 
a great range of harm, some inconsequential and some grave. The grave cases 
are those I am most interested in here. This is because the greater the diminu-
tion of agency, the greater the change in susceptibility to future harms.
It would be helpful to consider a comparison with the larger category of 
persons with diminished agency—sometimes referred to as those at the ‘mar-
gins of agency.’ Fetuses and young children have not yet developed their full 
host of agentive capacities, but we can assume that in most cases they will. We 
can make very good assumptions about what needs to be in place for them to 
realize many different possible life plans under varying value schemes.2 And, 
conversely, we can make very good assumptions about what will obstruct the 
realization of most life plans under various value schemes.3 Most patients with 
degenerative conditions can be assumed to have had a full host of agentive 
capacities at one time. For these patients, there is usually a life’s worth of ex-
periences, choices, and professions of belief through which to interpret the self 
1. Cf. Martha Nussbaum, “Objectification,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 24(4) (1995): 257; 
Rae Langton, Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 228–29; Lina Papadaki, “What is Objectifica-
tion?,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2010): 16–36.
2. See Nellie Wieland, “Parental Obligations,” Utilitas 23 (2011): 249–67.
3. Here I have in mind basic goods like nutrition, safety, invested adults, and affection. A 
list of what counts as basic goods for children is controversial and context- and culturally 
dependent, and I will not take a position on the details here. For a helpful discussion, see 
Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift. Family Values: The Ethics of Parent-Child Relation-
ships (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).
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expressed with diminished agentive capacities.4 In both cases we can make 
reasonable assumptions about what they will value in the future or have valued 
in the past. (Or, weaker: we can make reasonable assumptions about what they 
will need in place in order to value.)
The persons at the margins of agency that I have in mind differ from both 
of these cases. While they maintain minimal capacities for agency (like a basic 
ability to orient their will), they lack high-functioning social identities. They 
are estranged from their humanity in a different way than both the very young 
and those with degenerative conditions. It may be the case that the possibility 
of the recovery of agency is similar to the potential for agency in young chil-
dren. This might obligate us to treat them more as patients than as agents. And, 
unlike those with degenerative conditions, the victim of mistreatment may or 
may not have undergone a significant psychological break from a former self 
(depending on the initiation (i.e., from what age) and duration of her mistreat-
ment, there may be no complete former self). But, they are unlikely to have 
undergone a physiological change of any recognizable sort, yet the harms of 
serious mistreatment entail, in part, that they may not have a current or histori-
cal inventory of desires or values that are authentically their own. They may 
be unable to answer to or take responsibility for their choices or actions. They 
may not have any sort of coherent self. And, they may not regard themselves, 
or be regarded by others, as having value.5
Certainly, this sounds extreme. It may seem fantastical that a person’s ca-
pacities for agency could be so completely diminished through mistreatment 
alone. But, that would make the mistake of underestimating the consequences 
for agency of sustained mistreatment; it is a romantic view that each oppressed 
person maintains an authentic self, and a core capacity for agency, underneath 
the behavior exhibited in the oppressed state. This romanticism is dangerous 
(albeit hopeful) precisely because it ignores one of the greatest harms of mis-
treatment—namely, losing one’s self altogether. We can insist—boldly, too 
broadly—that humanity is not alienable under any conditions. If we insist this 
then of course we cannot be convinced that mistreatment alone could alienate 
a person from her humanity. But, if we think that alienation is possible, but just 
4. An excellent account of this can be found in Agniezka Jaworska, “Respecting the Margins 
of Agency: Alzheimer’s Patients and the Capacity to Value,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 
28(2) (1999): 105–38.
5. This final claim may seem unduly cynical. Again, I am trying to take seriously the pos-
sibility that structures of power in a given community disfavor those who are susceptible 
to mistreatment. The assumption behind the force of these structures of power is that their 
victims are not adequately valued. Not being valued is not the same as not being valuable. 
But, it would be disingenuous to assume that persons are valued comparably and as such 
can locate the source of their self as agent in that value.
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not as a result of oppression, then I doubt we are thinking about bad enough 
cases.
The kinds of cases I have in mind here are of people who have lived their 
lives at the margins of agency in a different way. These victims’ lives are con-
stituted by systematic and chronic denial of autonomy, reduction to body, and 
self-abnegation. They have been used as mere tools. They have not pursued in-
dependently constructed meaningful projects. And, perhaps most importantly, 
they identify with these outcomes, having never seen themselves as persons 
who are free, autonomous, and worthy of respect. They have suffered from 
the joint offenses of dehumanizing attitudes and the structures of power that 
enforce those attitudes.6 If humanity is alienable, and if it can be alienated by 
means of mistreatment rather than by, for example, degenerative physiological 
changes, then these are the best candidates for realizing this possibility. It will 
be helpful to consider some cases of diminished agency, and some arguments 
for how it is that this comes about. Then we can turn our attention to an analy-
sis of the harm that can be inflicted on resulting ersatz agents.
3. Cases
These examples illustrate the ways in which comprehensive mistreatment un-
dermines the agentive aspects of personhood. Two fictionalized cases are de-
scribed below (based loosely on real cases). I call these cases ‘comprehensive’ 
because they are those that are life-long or infect every aspect of a person’s 
life. They are not ‘comprehensive’ in the sense that the victims have lost all 
agentive capacity. The argument will then have to be scaled to fit the more 
common, less comprehensive cases by looking at the ways in which salvaged 
agentive capacities can be used to recover agency (more on this in Section 5).
The Fundamentalist Community: Imagine life inside a fundamentalist 
community (hereafter FC)7 organized around principles of polygyny, obedi-
ence, and patriarchy. FC’s commitment to polygyny is given a spiritual justifi-
cation: men are told that they cannot enter the kingdom of heaven unless they 
6. It has been suggested to me that it is difficult to tell whether a victim of oppression actually 
internalizes this loss of agency or if they only act in this way to cope with their oppressive 
circumstances. This is, of course, true of many people in oppressive circumstances: lift the 
oppression and they will agentively flourish. But two points are helpful here: (i) I’m not 
describing those kinds of cases; instead I’ve stipulated that I’m discussing self-abnegating, 
self-objectifying victims who have internalized this loss of agency. (ii) If there is nobody 
who is truly and deeply self-abnegating and self-objectifying in the sense described, then 
the dilemma at the beginning of the paper is resolved.
7. Some readers may recognize similarities between FC and at least one real world funda-
mentalist community. This is intentional; details are glossed to meet the needs of my argu-
ment, so I thought it fair to make the case fictional. However, the description is very close 
to accurate of the real world community.
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have at least three wives, and the more wives they have the more likely they 
are to enter heaven. FC recognizes a prophet who has complete control over 
marriages in the sense that he decides when women and girls marry, whom 
they marry, when marriages will be dissolved, and to whom the wives and 
children will be re-assigned; the current prophet also decides when men marry, 
which wives be will given and taken away from men, and how many wives 
a given man can have. Women are told that they can only enter the kingdom 
of heaven by invitation of their husband. Given this, they are told to regard 
themselves as one with their husband’s desires in all respects because doing 
so will increase their likelihood of being invited to heaven (complete submis-
sion is a spiritual act—the only one that these girls and women engage in). 
The submission of wives to husbands is only trumped by submission to the 
current prophet, and includes all sexual choices, all reproductive choices, all 
matters related to the protection or abuse of children, and all matters related 
to dress, livelihood, home, and lifestyle. The community runs its own schools 
and police departments so that the children never learn anything outside of the 
teachings of the prophet and they have no access to authorities outside of their 
family and the FC priesthood.
An understanding of a community like FC provides a good resource for 
analyzing the moral problems entailed by diminution of agency. Girls and 
women in this community are absolutely oppressed—there isn’t even a pre-
tense of exalting their purity by means of their oppression. They are tools for 
the salvation of men as their wives and as producers of a great number of chil-
dren—both to grow the religion and to provide more daughters. The submis-
sion and obedience, subordination and abuse of girls and women is not an ac-
cident; it’s built into the central teaching of the church. Any sort of expression 
or construction of identity, choice-making, display of emotion, or agency are 
punishable; wives must submit to their husbands in all respects. In communi-
ties like FC, women and girls are born into pseudo-agency and can only leave 
it by completely abandoning their family, home, and resources. They have no 
education to rely on, no authorities to trust, and no right to own property.
Angel in the House: Virginia Woolf describes the Victorian woman, whom 
she calls the Angel in the House, in the following way:
She was intensely sympathetic. She was immensely charming. She excelled 
in the difficult arts of family life. She sacrificed herself daily. If there was 
chicken, she took the leg. If there was a draught, she sat in it—in short, 
she was so constituted that she never had a mind or wish of her own, but 
preferred to sympathise always with the minds and wishes of others.8
Andrea Westlund says about Woolf and the Angel: ‘Becoming a person who 
would defer systematically to those around her, making her will dependent on 
8. Virginia Woolf, Women and Writing (New York: Harcourt, 1904/1979), 59.
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theirs for its content, seemed, to Woolf, to entail a kind of death of the self.’9 
For Woolf, ‘sympathising’ with others entailed taking their ends as one’s own, 
self-objectifying as a tool for their projects, and doing so quite ambitiously in 
order to live up to the Victorian ideal. This sense of ‘death’ was dire for Woolf 
who devoted so much of her work to escaping the claustrophobia of the minds 
of others. Westlund argues that the deferential, self-abnegating Angel, even 
though she might wholly identify with and idealize such self-abnegation,10 
ought not be considered an autonomous agent unless she can engage in a dia-
logical reconstruction, exchange, and defense of her reasons for her choices, 
beliefs, desires, and actions. Westlund explains her view in this way:
Deeply deferential characters lack a disposition to hold themselves 
answerable to external, critical perspectives such as our own. The disposition 
to answer for oneself, or to be “self-representing” in justificatory dialogue, 
constitutes a self-orientation to which I refer to . . . as “responsibility for 
self.”11
This is a rich and correct starting point for an appropriate condition on agency 
that goes beyond mere identification with one’s ends, projects, and beliefs. 
Answerability, taking responsibility, and dialogical engagement are convinc-
ing prerequisites for robust agency. It is reasonable to think that many of the 
FC women and Woolf’s Angel, by and large, lack the comparative, critical 
resources to demonstrate agency in this way. And perhaps this is the exact 
result we should expect; it is this suffocation of agency that makes the FC 
community and aspects of Victorian society so repugnant to most observers, 
after all. But still, we can interpret this result as meaning that those who cannot 
take responsibility for self are not, in fact, agents. In identification of the harm 
of the loss of agency, we also identify the victim as a kind of pseudo-agent.
There is a bit of theoretical work that helps us understand how this loss of 
agency can be brought about. In Kant’s discussions of sexual objectification he 
focuses primarily on the use of another person’s (and one’s own) body rather 
than confining his discussion to the objectifying regard or attitude that one has 
for another (or for oneself).12 But, Kant also claims that regarding a person 
9. Andrea Westlund, “Selflessness and Responsibility for Self: Is Deference Compatible 
with Autonomy?,” Philosophical Review 112(4) (2003): 483. In fact, in the passage from 
Woolf’s Women and Writing cited by Westlund, Woolf says that the Angel in the House so 
‘bothered her,’ ‘wasted her time,’ and ‘tormented her’ that she had to kill her. She describes 
the Victorian Angel as a kind of ghost who haunted writers like herself. The haunting 
comes from the fact that Angel was the ideal Victorian woman—and, as a shell of an agent, 
being the Angel was incompatible with being a writer.
10. And so, Westlund argues, would still meet Harry Frankfurt’s influential criteria for au-
tonomy. The fact that Angel identifies her own desires with the desires of others is an insuf-
ficient test for autonomy, argues Westlund.
11. Westlund, “Selflessness and Responsibility for Self,” 484–85.
12. It is important to see the richer sense that Kant had in mind in treating someone as a mere 
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as an object is powerful enough to make that person into a kind of thing. He 
clearly thinks that the moral harm that comes from thinking of another person 
as a thing results from the incompatibility of thinking this way while maintain-
ing respect for personhood:
[T]here lies in this inclination a degradation of man; for as soon as anyone 
becomes an object of another’s appetite, all motives of moral relationship 
fall away; as the object of another’s appetite, that person is in fact a thing.13
Kant thinks there is a close connection between having an appetite for a per-
son’s body and using that person as an object. He also thinks that the harm ini-
tiates in the regard one has for another, and whether that regard is for humanity 
or for an object of appetite.14
Nussbaum describes a version of this view, but locates the harm in the way 
a free, autonomous person is seen as an unfree object—something reduced to 
a body (or its parts), or to mere appearances, or as a mere means, or as some-
thing lacking choice and consent. In her analysis of objectification she puts 
this point as follows: ‘One is treating as an object what is really not an object, 
what is, in fact, a human being. The notion of humanity is involved in quite 
a Kantian way. . . . [O]bjectification entails making into a thing, treating as a 
thing, something that is not really a thing.’15 And further:
[This] shows us how a certain sort of instrumental use of persons, negating 
the autonomy that is proper to them as persons, also leaves the human 
being so denuded of humanity, in the eyes of the objectifier, that he or she 
seems ripe for other abuses as well. . . . The lesson seems to be that there is 
something especially problematic about instrumentalizing human beings, 
something that involves denying what is fundamental to them as human 
beings, namely, the status of beings [as] ends in themselves. From this one 
denial, other forms of objectification that are not logically entailed by the 
first seem to follow.16
A related, albeit much stronger, view is that some forms of mistreatment 
change the properties of their victim. For example, in treating someone as 
fungible I can make it the case that she is in fact fungible; in treating someone 
means. When Kant writes, ‘Humanity itself is a dignity; for a man cannot be used merely as 
a means by any man . . . but must always be used at the same time as an end’ (Metaphysics 
of Morals 6:462), this might be distinguishable from mere regard as a means, or as a thing. 
In Lectures on Ethics Kant specifically elaborates on this point with respect to sexual activ-
ity rather than objectifying thoughts.
13. Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 27:384–85.
14. Kant is also unusual among those who write about objectification in being concerned with 
the moral consequences for the objectifier as well as the objectified. When he says in this 
passage that, ‘there lies in this inclination a degradation of man,’ he probably means to 
suggest that the degradation is on both sides.
15. Nussbaum, “Objectification,” 257.
16. Ibid., 265.
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as lacking in autonomy I can make it the case that she in fact lacks autonomy. 
This view is defended by Sally Haslanger:
[I]f one objectifies something (or someone), one views it and treats it as an 
object for the satisfaction of one’s desire; but this is not all, for objectification 
is assumed to be a relation of domination where one also has the power to 
enforce one’s view. Objectification is not just ‘in the head’; it is actualized, 
embodied, imposed. . . . So if one objectifies something, one not only views 
it as something which would satisfy one’s desire, but one also has the power 
to make it have the properties one desires it to have.17
A person is made into an object through mechanisms of power and objectify-
ing attitudes: the slogan is ‘thinking plus power makes it so.’18 Earlier state-
ments of this view came from Catherine MacKinnon:19 ‘See: what a woman 
“is” is what you have made women be,’20 ‘[the projection of properties onto 
women] is not just an illusion or a fantasy or a mistake. It becomes embodied 
because it is enforced.’21 Here is another statement of the same view, from 
Andrea Dworkin: ‘Objectification occurs when a human being . . . is made less 
than human, turned into a thing or commodity. When objectification occurs, 
a person is depersonalized . . . those who can be used as if they are not fully 
human are no longer fully human.’22
Finally, Rae Langton also defends a version of this view:
[Someone who adopts an objectifying attitude] may turn people into 
objects, in so far as that is possible. If human beings have an ‘inalienable’ 
dignity, as Kant says, then there will be limits on how far this process can 
go: one cannot turn a human being into something that is entirely unfree, a 
mere tool, something that is exhausted by its sensory appearance, its body. 
. . . But a person can be made less free, more tool-like, and a person’s 
appearance and bodily qualities can be made to play a more exaggerated 
role in her own social identity.23
17. Sally Haslanger, “On Being Objective and Being Objectified,” in A Mind of One’s Own, ed. 
Louise Antony and Charlotte Witt (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 228.
18. Ibid., 228. Haslanger also quotes Monique Wittig making a similar claim: ‘They are seen as 
black, therefore they are black; they are seen as women, therefore they are women. But be-
fore being seen that way, they first had to be made that way’ (“One is Not Born a Woman,” 
Feminist Issues 1 [1981]: 48–49).
19. Versions of MacKinnon’s view are expressed in several places. Cf. Feminism Unmodified: 
Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988).
20. Quoted in Haslanger, “On Being Objective,” 229.
21. Quoted in Langton, Sexual Solipsism, 333. The full breadth of MacKinnon’s views is both 
stronger and more nuanced than what is reflected here. She and Dworkin both argue that 
susceptibility to objectification is intrinsic to being a woman, particularly a heterosexual 
woman.
22. Andrea Dworkin, “Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography, and Equality,” in 
Oxford Readings in Feminism and Pornography, ed. Drucilla Cornell (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 19–44, 30–31.
23. Langton, Sexual Solipsism, 333.
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What does it mean for a person to undergo a change in properties? It is theo-
retically messy, but most accurate, to say that persons become ‘less free, more 
tool-like.’ This entails that a person loses capacities for agency. A denial of au-
tonomy does not entail a complete lack of agency. A person whose autonomy 
is compromised could still maintain some features of agency. A person could 
move toward becoming agentially inert, even if not ever arriving at complete 
inertness. The fact that victims of this kind of oppression never lose all ca-
pacities for agency does not affect the analysis here. As a point of comparison, 
there are still interesting questions about the agency of small children and pa-
tients with severe degenerative conditions even though they are not completely 
agentially inert. The same point holds for victims of sustained mistreatment.
The oppression in the FC and the Angel in the House is the kind of oppres-
sion described by Westlund, Kant, Nussbaum, Haslanger, and Langton. The 
two cases differ in important ways; yet, we can plausibly say that the women 
in FC are at the greatest risk of loss of agency. They are treated as instruments 
for reproduction and the salvation of men; they are denied autonomy in basic 
life decisions such as marriage, reproduction, employment, and home; they are 
considered fungible as one among multiple wives and mothers; they are owned 
by their husbands and prophet; they are denied subjectivity by not determining 
the terms and conditions of their intimate relations; and they are reduced to 
their bodies as reproductive vessels. As described, Angel is principally objecti-
fied insofar as being deeply self-abnegating is essentially a denial of autonomy 
and subjectivity. This may be a form of internalized oppression; this is compat-
ible with it being socially structured and enforced. (As we move ahead with 
our analysis using these two cases as our examples, the reader is encouraged 
to consider other cases, and the implications of this argument for these cases. 
For example: long-term kidnap victims who are confined, kept isolated from 
the world, and used as [sexual] tools; histories of enslavement and servitude; 
children who are chronically abused before a social identity or sense of self has 
a chance to form; monks who regard their own bodies as vessels of divine will; 
captives who are ‘broken’ through interrogation methods; those who spend 
long periods of time in solitary confinement; and even speculative cases—
such as the organ donors described in Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go.)
Have these victims lost (or perhaps never gained) some of the properties 
of personhood? And if that is the case, then is there anything wrong with treat-
ing them as objects? This question is put bluntly, but the answer will have to 
be subtle. It is intuitive to think that the reason treating people as objects is 
morally wrong is because of their moral qualities as persons. And some forms 
of oppression might be such that the victims lose these very qualities of per-
sonhood. If we maintain a neutral stance on whether persons actually acquire 
the features of objects through mistreatment, we should still recognize that 
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people are not in principle invincible to this kind of harm. Our susceptibility 
to this kind of harm falls somewhere between utter vulnerability and invinci-
bility. Where it falls differs depending on many factors including one’s age, 
temperament, and social circumstance (more detail in Section 5). Given this, 
a theory for everyone and all cases cannot be provided. It will be helpful in 
understanding the arguments and objections in Section 4 to keep in mind this 
space between vulnerability and invincibility.
4. How Can a Person Stripped of Agential Capacities Be Harmed?
If someone can lose aspects of their personhood then, in some sense, their 
humanity is both alienable and alienated. If this is the case, they undergo a 
change in moral status such that there is not anything wrong with continuing 
to treat them as objects. I address this implication in parts. In 4.1, I consider the 
general question of whether humanity is alienable, in part or in whole. In 4.2, I 
re-frame the problem as a comparison of possible harms to agents, rather than 
as a question of change in moral status. Addressing each of these questions is 
crucial to a complete understanding the stripping of agency as moral harm.
4.1. To What Extent Is Humanity Alienable?
The strongest objection to this way of proceeding is just to deny that human-
ity is alienable, in part or in whole, as noted at the outset. It is plausible that 
pseudo-agents should be treated as persons and not as objects because we do 
not tend to think that pseudo-agents have suffered some irreversible harm, or 
that they have suffered some serious damage to their capacities or faculties. 
Our tendency is to think that, even if pseudo-agents have diminished agency, 
they have maintained many other capacities that distinguish them from others 
whom we might more clearly identify as living on the margins of agency.
However, it might still be objected that one’s humanity may be alienated, 
but never entirely eliminated. As such, it can be recovered. The idea here is 
that pseudo-agents do not undergo a change in moral status because they main-
tain the capacity for agency even if they are not now in a position to use it. 
While it is the case that some victims of mistreatment are not able to demon-
strate autonomous agency by, for example, orienting their own life and choices 
in a way that is indicative of their authentic values, and not able to demonstrate 
self-responsibility by being answerable for their beliefs and actions, it is still 
plausible that these are abilities they could come to have. Virginia Woolf fa-
mously thought that the Victorian woman needed a room of her own—and that 
flourishing would come with it.
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As test cases, the FC women and the Angel are grave cases of mistreat-
ment. But, it might be wrong to persist in object-appropriate treatment because 
oppression is rarely able to completely strip a person of agency. If it only leads 
a person to be made more ‘tool-like,’ as Langton says, but not a ‘tool,’ then 
treatment of that person as a tool would still constitute moral harm. If it’s the 
case that—for some reason that requires independent justification—human-
ity is inalienable, then regardless of how far a person has been stripped, they 
maintain a recoverable capacity for agency that is deserving of respect.
So, mistreatment or oppression in degrees may strip a person of agency, or 
may make the victim a temporary object. But beyond this, or in other contexts, 
persistent object-appropriate treatment is still bad. This response marks the 
agentive differences between the gravely oppressed and other persons at the 
margins of agency (more on this below). It also explains the intuitive sense that 
oppression comes in degrees, can be recovered from in degrees, and, in turn, 
that there are few people who can be identified as completely intact agents 
or entirely dehumanized objects. Yet, it still does not speak fully to the moral 
status of the victims in the interim—which is my concern here.
4.2 Comparison of Harms
Perhaps there is a more helpful way of characterizing the question of post-
hoc harms to the oppressed; we could ask instead how these harms compare 
to harms to other agents. Begin by considering a cognate argument: there are 
several ways of resolving difficult problems concerning the relative moral sta-
tus of non-human animals, human infants, and adult humans given the ro-
bust differences in capacities between each of these groups. We could rely 
on potentiality properties, we could argue that there are gradations in moral 
status between the groups, or we could ground our position on the inequality 
of harms to members of each of these groups.24 Take the last (and best) option; 
we should say that there are unequal harms to different entities such that a 
seemingly similar harm to an adult person, to a human infant, and to a non-
human animal would in fact be an unequal harm since the adult person can be 
harmed by the same event in many more complicated ways. This allows for the 
possibility that moral patients can be harmed in unequal ways, without saying 
anything about their core moral status.
‘Agents differ in their core moral status’ is a stronger claim than ‘agents 
can be harmed unequally for reasons independent of core moral status.’ The 
most conservative interpretation of the way in which oppression diminishes 
agency is that it affects the susceptibility to harm rather than alters the moral 
24. For a version of this final claim, see Elizabeth Harman, “The Potentiality Problem,” Philo-
sophical Studies 114(1–2) (2003): 176.
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status of the victim. I will assume this conservative reading rather than mak-
ing the stronger (and less tenable) case that victims of mistreatment undergo a 
change in core moral status.25
In order to compare harms (rather than statuses) let’s introduce a contrast 
case to the FC women and the Victorian Angel. Call her Murphy Brown. This 
is the kind of agent who has beliefs and desires of her own, who organizes her 
resources around realizing her desires and acting on her beliefs, who recog-
nizes deference as only occasionally appropriate in the scheme of a well-func-
tioning social identity, and who cultivates and maintains the skills of dialogical 
engagement and justification with other, similarly situated agents. She enjoys 
the full privileges and abilities of personhood and attempts at oppression are 
deflected by the strength of her agency and the external structures of power in 
which she is a participant rather than a victim.
Now compare harms to Murphy Brown and to Angel. If Murphy Brown has 
a life plan that aligns with her values, and she is harmed by not being able to 
pursue this life plan, is she harmed more gravely than Angel who has no life 
plan of her own and no values of her own with which to align? The harm of 
having x taken away is similar for Murphy Brown and for Angel but unequal. 
Now the question is how far down this goes. Is it the case that a great array of 
similar harms are unequal? And, how does (post hoc) oppression harm Mur-
phy Brown and Angel, respectively? If harm is somehow proportionate to that 
which is valued, then it looks as if a person who is not valued by others and 
fails to value herself is not harmed in as many ways as a person who is valued 
and who values herself. If this is correct, it goes down deeply through most 
aspects of life that matter to us—those that evince our values, our aspirations, 
and our self-reflective identity. Of course, it doesn’t go all the way down, since 
harms that involve pain, or bodily destruction and manipulation, or emotional 
distress, for example, would be equal for Murphy Brown and for Angel.
The conclusion that follows is this: if it is the case that, in being oppressed, 
someone takes on the qualities of passivity, deference, manipulability, and a 
lack of self-regard, it does not harm her as much as it would otherwise to treat 
her in a consonant manner. The contrast is with the person who has not been 
oppressed and has none of these qualities. In the contrast case, the fully real-
ized agent is not passive, not deferential, not manipulable, and she has reason-
able self-regard. Harming her by interfering with the execution of her plans 
and projects is a harm to those values which are her own, not those which 
involve deep self-abnegation. Consider the case of a woman living in FC who 
identifies with the life plans of her husband because they are her husband’s 
25. I am not taking a position here on what ‘core moral status’ means or picks out. Whatever 
grants moral status varies, of course, by moral theory. One of the virtues of focusing on 
unequal harms rather that unequal statuses is that I can remain neutral on this question.
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and not for any other reason. We could say that both she and her husband 
identify with those life plans. But if those plans are obstructed—if she and her 
husband are prevented from pursuing those plans—it seems correct to say that 
he is harmed more than she is because those plans were never really hers in the 
same sense that they were his.
Even stepping back from saying that victims of oppression have a dimin-
ished moral status, and saying instead that harms to them are not equal to the 
harms of fully realized persons, still sounds repugnant. But what are we sup-
posed to say in this case? The reason that it harms Murphy Brown if we ob-
struct her life plan is, almost entirely, because the plan is hers and it aligns with 
values that she endorses. If neither of these things is true of Angel, then what is 
the sense in which she is harmed by obstructing her opportunities? The way in 
which we are inclined to account for harms to Murphy Brown in any other con-
text (i.e., when not comparing her to Angel) would be to cast the discussion in 
terms of what Murphy Brown authentically values, why she values it, and what 
the implications are for her being forced to assume a life plan that is not her 
own. Angel is harmed precisely by having the opportunity to form plans taken 
away from her; and once this is taken away from her, her susceptibility to harm 
similarly shifts. She is not in a position to dialogically defend her life plan, and 
thereby demonstrate her agency, in part, because she does not have one.26
This makes it look like the harm to persons like Angel is a kind of harm to 
the faculties of its victims which can in turn lead to subsequent harms in op-
portunities and possibilities for their realization. It alters the victims’ sense of 
self-worth, makes them feel fungible, forces them to identify with and fulfill 
the ends of another, until these things become realized.
5. Agency for Objects: Recovered Agency for Undone Persons
This suggests that the kind of moral patient that the victim becomes is one who 
doesn’t require the same kinds of consideration that Murphy Brown requires, but 
requires a different kind altogether. It is a kind of consideration that needs to be 
oriented toward the recovery of her humanity rather than toward the ordinary real-
ization of it. Again, there are similarities to the kind of respect owed to young chil-
dren and those suffering from degenerative conditions, but it is not the same. The 
young are paternalistically nurtured through their development, while dementia 
patients may be owed a chance to maintain a dignity in their current state that 
reflects the values of their former selves. Angel, on the other hand, might be owed 
a chance at recovery of the self she could have had, had things gone differently.27
26. Here again it’s helpful to look to Westlund’s richly argued views on the deficiencies of the 
self-abnegating agent. Westlund, “Selflessness and Responsibility for Self.”
27. The development of children is different from the recovery referred to here. In most cases, 
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Maybe a helpful concept to develop in light of the differences between 
Murphy Brown and Angel would be something like the plasticity of agency. 
This can have multiple meanings. For example, I have suggested that even 
mild mistreatment can have harmful repercussions for agentive capacities, ac-
cording to the extent of mistreatment and the prior strength of agency. Murphy 
Brown has more personal resources to deflect mistreatment than a young teen-
ager does. This allows for the possibility that each of us has agentive capaci-
ties that come and go, in part, on the basis of mistreatment. The plasticity of 
agency also suggests that degraded agentive capacities can be recovered when 
there are no physiological barriers. The extent of the degradation makes a dif-
ference for the argument here: if an entity completely lacks agency, no sense 
can be made of ‘recovery’—there is no way to get this off the ground. It is only 
in the case where an entity retains some marks of agency that ‘recovery’ can 
occur. What these marks are is, in part, an empirical matter and goes beyond 
the conceptual analysis at hand. If an analysis of moral harm suggests a cor-
responding moral obligation, then the suggestion here is for an obligation of 
making possible the recovery of agency, even if we think that we do not owe a 
partial agent what we owe a well-functioning agent.
Returning to the puzzle from the beginning of the paper: what is wrong 
with continuing to treat the those with diminished agency as objects? Rich 
characterizations of those who self-abnegate or live their lives according to 
the value schemes of another without any sense of justificatory engagement 
or endorsement are also characterizations of pseudo-agency. They are char-
acterizations of how persons can be alienated from their agentive capacities. 
The subsequent moral problem in the case where these victims continue to 
be mistreated is the prevention of the recovery of humanity. This cannot be 
the end of the story. A defense of this claim certainly requires two further 
moves. First, there needs to be resolution of the question of whether agents 
are only worthwhile once they are already agents. Second, there needs to be 
further justification of the obligation to bring agents into being. At the very 
least, an understanding of the first claim would require a view as to what gives 
persons moral worth; this view cannot include any claims about our agentive 
capacity. The first claim would have to be grounded in a potentiality argument 
or a tightly controlled counter-factual argument.28 Neither of these routes is 
unproblematic.
children’s development unfolds on its own, unless hindered through abuse and hardship. 
The most serious victims of mistreatment have become alienated from their potential 
selves and cannot see themselves as sources of value. Although I have not defended this 
here, it does not seem like a mere absence of further harm is sufficient to make recovery 
possible.
28. I believe that the latter is the approach favored by Rae Langton.
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The second claim will require a somewhat easier defense. We may in fact 
have an obligation to bring agents into being. This could be grounded in what-
ever reasons we have for respecting one another’s existing agency. For ex-
ample, if A has an obligation to create the conditions of B’s agential flourishing 
under a scheme of flourishing decided by B, then A may, for the same reason, 
have an obligation to bring about the conditions such that B could formulate 
a scheme of flourishing to begin with. Seeing your life’s choices as aligned 
with a sense of self requires first that you have some sense of self, and so it 
is reasonable to suppose that we are obligated to help each person realize that 
as a starting point. Of course, this brings us back to a version of the problem 
with which this paper opened: what reasons do we have to have to promote the 
conditions of agency for those that lack agential capacities? I don’t think that 
problem is resolved even if I have tempered its force. This paper concludes 
with a richer analysis of threats to agency as a basic and systemic harm. When 
agential capacities are damaged, this leads to second-order harms to the ability 
to identify authentically constructed life plans with values, and to identify a 
sense of self with the realization of those values.
Some forms of oppression involve thinking of a person as an object, us-
ing that person as an object, and thereby making it the case that that person 
comes to have the qualities of an object. One of my tasks here has been to think 
through whether this process is only harmful in itself or whether it creates 
further susceptibility to harm. I have argued that through mistreatment persons 
can come to lack the marks of agency: the ability to authentically identify with 
their own values, form life plans, and take responsibility for their selves. I have 
tried to find a way of accepting, in some sense, the conclusion that some forms 
of oppression result in diminished agency, thereby changing the constitution 
of the victims and making them susceptible to similar but unequal harms. This 
surprising result is accompanied by a suggestion that just as the agency of the 
victim is lost, they assume a different status as patient, and are owed a differ-
ent kind of respect. The ground of this respect comes from the possibility of 
recovery, and what we can hope is a kind of plasticity of agency.29
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